KISUMU, 10th February –As Kenya edges closer to the 2027 general elections, the familiar choreography of pre-electoral governance is once again on display. Across history and across regimes, moments of economic hardship often coincide with policy generosity—not necessarily because structural transformation has suddenly become possible, but because voter vulnerability has reached its peak.
President William Ruto’s administration is currently rolling out a set of highly visible economic and development policies that, while framed as relief measures, also function as strategic instruments for political consolidation. This is not unique to Kenya, nor is it new in political science; it is a classic example of electoral economics, where governments seek to convert policy actions into political loyalty ahead of a vote.
Tax Exemption
The recent announcement that Kenyans earning Sh30,000 and below will be exempt from PAYE taxation, alongside reduced tax rates for those earning up to Sh50,000, must be understood within this context. For millions of low-income earners struggling with inflation, rising fuel prices, and stagnant wages, tax relief is immediately tangible and emotionally resonant. It communicates empathy and responsiveness.
Yet from a governance perspective, such relief raises questions about fiscal sustainability, especially in an economy already grappling with debt servicing pressures. Political economy literature is clear: tax cuts timed close to elections often defer the pain rather than resolve it, pushing adjustment costs into the post-electoral period when political accountability weakens.
The same logic applies to the much-celebrated NYOTA Fund, a World Bank–supported youth empowerment programme promising skills development, entrepreneurship support, and grants of roughly Sh50,000 to selected beneficiaries across all 47 counties. Youth unemployment is one of Kenya’s most volatile political fault lines, and any government that appears to “see” the youth secures immediate symbolic capital.
However, the nationwide branding, accelerated rollout, and political visibility of NYOTA place it squarely within what political scientists describe as targeted distributive politics—where benefits are diffused broadly enough to generate goodwill, but thinly enough to avoid deep structural reform. The danger is not the fund itself, but the expectations it creates in a context where job creation remains sluggish and industrial policy weak. Infrastructure revival further reinforces this electoral logic.
Mega Infrastructure
The renewed emphasis on large-scale projects—most notably the proposed extension of the Standard Gauge Railway toward Kisumu and Malaba, alongside expansive road construction plans—signals a deliberate outreach to regions historically aligned with ODM and outside the UDA political heartland.
Infrastructure has always been one of the most powerful tools of political persuasion because it is visible, geographically anchored, and easily framed as evidence of inclusion. Yet when infrastructure prioritisation aligns closely with electoral geography rather than long-term economic planning, it risks reproducing patronage rather than correcting inequality. The rallies in Western Kenya, Nyanza, and parts of the Coast where these projects are announced are therefore not accidental; they are part of a recalibrated electoral map.
Complementing these initiatives is the expansion and digitisation of credit and enterprise schemes such as the Hustler Fund, Youth Enterprise Fund, Women Enterprise Fund, and related affirmative action programmes. These platforms reinforce the administration’s populist narrative of economic empowerment from below, positioning the state as a direct partner of the ordinary Kenyan.
In political terms, this personalises the relationship between voter and regime, shifting loyalty away from institutions toward individual leaders and platforms. While access to credit is important, the absence of strong safeguards against over-indebtedness and the limited linkage to productive sectors raise concerns about long-term economic payoff.
Pre-Electoral Generosity
The deeper problem, however, lies beyond the present moment. History suggests that once elections are won and political pressure subsides, governments that relied heavily on pre-electoral generosity often pivot sharply toward austerity, tax recovery, and expenditure cuts. Kenyans must therefore prepare to face a harsher post-2027 reality: tighter fiscal policies, renewed taxation, stalled projects, and reduced social spending as the state attempts to rebalance accounts strained by politically motivated spending.
This cycle erodes trust, weakens the social contract, and entrenches cynicism—citizens learn to expect relief only during campaign seasons, not as a function of consistent governance.
In sum, the tax exemptions, the NYOTA Fund, revived infrastructure projects, and expanded credit access are not illusions; they are real policies with real effects. But their timing, framing, and political deployment reveal a deeper strategy that exploits voter vulnerability under economic stress.
Political science teaches us that when governance is subordinated to electoral calendars, development becomes episodic rather than transformative. The question Kenyans must therefore confront is not whether these policies feel good now, but whether they are sustainable, equitable, and honest—or merely another chapter in the recurring story of pre-election generosity followed by post-election hardship.
Odhiambo A. Kasera is a Political Scientist and Adjunct Lecturer at Maseno, Rongo and the University of Kabianga.
