The strategy is simple: fragmentation first, absorption next, and incumbent wins
KISUMU, 4th March, 2026 –In several of my earlier posts, especially written after the passing of Raila Odinga, I made a claim many considered too strong at the time: Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party and it’s anchor micro-ideology would not outlive its founder as a coherent political machine.
My argument was not emotional but one informed by the lenses of the rise and fall of ideologies and institutions. I argued that the party was built around authority concentration rather than internal democratic reproduction where leadership was personally curated, not competitively renewed.
I concluded that while that kind of structure mobilized power very effectively, it could only survive while the central figure remains present and authoritative.
What we are witnessing now inside ODM is therefore not simply factional disagreement, but it is the structural exposure of a party that has hoped for leadership institutionalization for over a decade. The mutual distrust among senior figures, the absence of a universally accepted successor centre, and the rapid ideological drift are not random developments but predictable outcomes of a personalized party architecture suddenly forced into succession mode.
While my analysis in the post-Raila and Odingaism has been concentrated on internal factors, when one reads the present moment structurally rather than emotionally, a second layer becomes visible: the fragmentation of the party is itself a politically significant development not only as an additional evidence for the Death of the Party (DoTP), but an important component of the Ruto reelection grand strategy and the cementing of Rutoism as a replacement of Odingaism.
I developed three core arguments to unpack the dynamics of this claim.
Claim 1: The “Linda Mwananchi” Faction is Transitional, Not Foundational, and Ruto Prefers it That Way
The current Kenya’s public narrative presents a clean binary split inside ODM; the pro-Ruto versus anti-Ruto. But the anti-Ruto bloc currently associated with Edwin Sifuna,James Orengo, Babu Owino and the “Linda Mwananchi” mood should be understood as a reactionary formation, not yet a durable political vehicle.
It emerged suddenly after the leadership vacuum shock caused by Raila’s death, it lacks an independent financing backbone, has no nationally consolidated party structure, and is forming late in the electoral cycle.
According history the rarest thing is a political surprise and electoral politics is unforgiving to late, underfunded, emotionally driven formations, especially when facing an incumbent with deep state and coalition networks particularly in African political culture.
Seasoned politicians inside that bloc know that removing a resource-rich incumbent requires a broad, well-funded, strategically disciplined coalition, not a moral protest formation.
The most probable path, therefore, is eventual absorption into a wider opposition arrangement alongside figures such as Rigathi Gachagua of (DCP), Kalonzo Musyoka (Wiper), or Fred Matiang’i (Jubilee). The moment that merger happens, the independent identity of that ODM faction disappears. Its now very vigorous youthful energy becomes coalition arithmetic as it will be consumed in disorganization of whichever coalition it enters.
That outcome, will happen naturally, and when nature fails, Ruto will intervene. In many ways, Ruto is already tilting the faction toward that outcome. Why? Because he is the direct beneficiary as an independent, youth-energized ODM successor force would be far more electorally disruptive than a diluted coalition component.
The strategy is simple: fragmentation first, absorption next, and incumbent wins.
Claim 2: ODM’s Internal Split Weakens the Pro-Ruto Wing’s Negotiating Power
It is commonly assumed that the ODM figures perceived as closer to Ruto, ‘led’ by party leader Oburu Oginga and Homabay County Governor Gladys Wanga, are strengthened by alignment. But the deepening fragmentation actually weakens their bargaining leverage.
The common trend in our heavily balkanized politics is that once a party appears numerically and symbolically fractured, its negotiating value for next government portfolios significantly drops. From where I sit, there is a thinktank within Ruto’s camp that are interpreting the ODM fracturing strategically and are now working on a narrative of mass internal exodus from ODM A (pro-Ruto) to ODM B (anti-Ruto).
This narrative is going to be turned around against Oburu-Wanga faction by the incumbent side to argue that the faction no longer commands the voting bloc it once represented under the very enigmatic late Raila Odinga.
The political fact which is about to work against the team is that in negotiation politics, perceived numbers matter as much as actual numbers. A divided ODM allows Ruto’s camp to renegotiate commitments downward (based on a perceived mass exodus) diversify allies, and reduce dependency on any single ODM wing.
In that sense, the division is going to serve the purpose to discipline the partners and it does not empower them. The split therefore functions as leverage compression — reducing ODM’s internal factions from power brokers to negotiators from weakness.
Claim 3: Controlled Opposition Fragmentation Fits Ruto’s Broader Incumbency Method
Since coming to power, Ruto’s political method has leaned less on direct confrontation and more on selective absorption, opponent fragmentation, and alliance recalibration. Draw in some rivals, neutralize others, let the rest divide internally, then negotiate from a position of centralized stability. That pattern has repeated across multiple political theatres. ODM’s internal disintegration fits neatly into this model of controlled opposition dispersion.
A fragmented opposition landscape produces three strategic advantages for an incumbent: it prevents the rise of a single successor centre, forces rivals into coalition dependency bargains, and turns elections into alliance management rather than wave mobilization.
Under those conditions, the election becomes less about removing an incumbent and more about coordinating competitors, historically a much harder task. Fragmentation is therefore not just an event; it is a strategic environment that favors the sitting president.
Put simply, what many are reading as a simple pro-Ruto versus anti-Ruto split inside ODM may actually be something more consequential: fragmentation that structurally advantages the incumbent on multiple fronts.
If the Sifuna-aligned bloc dissolves into coalition politics, the incumbent benefits. If the pro-Ruto ODM wing negotiates from reduced leverage, the incumbent benefits. If no unified post-Raila centre emerges, the incumbent benefits.
Summarily, ODM’s crisis is not only internal but also a strategically externalized, and unless a new, internally democratic, institutionally grounded opposition formation emerges (which is a near implausibility), personality-successor politics will continue to lose against strategy-driven incumbency politics heading toward the 2027 general election plebiscite.
Okombo Odhiambo Kasera is a Political Scientist and Adjunct Lecturer, Maseno, Rongo and University of Kabianga.
