KISUMU, May 12th -The contours of a post-Odingaism political order are unfolding much as they were always going to. To the untrained eye, what we are witnessing may appear chaotic, even unprecedented. It is neither.
Kenyan politics has always reorganized itself around the exit—or weakening—of a dominant political centre. What we are seeing now is simply the system adjusting to the gradual erosion of Raila Odingaism as the singular most consequential post-election anchor.
The noise, the fragmentation, the visible anxiety across political actors—these are not signs of disorder, but of transition. The disorder is political strategy. As it is always in African context.
If one reads the moment structurally, the direction is fairly clear. ODM, as a political vehicle anchored on Odingaism, has effectively exhausted its historical function. As I have argued before. Not in the sense of immediate electoral disappearance, but in its diminished capacity to organize national-level counter-power.
“Rutoism” Strategy
In its place, William Ruto’s UDA is not just consolidating state power but attempting something deeper—an ideological and organizational replacement.
What I have elsewhere described as “Rutoism” is not merely about governance style, but also a well thought out strategy (underpinned with myriad of tacts), to reconfigure the grammar of political loyalty, patronage, and national alignment in a post-Raila environment.
It is within this shifting terrain that what I call “Raila’s orphans” must now locate themselves.
Their survival is not guaranteed, and more importantly, it is not uniform. Raila’s Orphans’ survival will depend on at least three interrelated factors.
Firstly, the scale of their political ambition, Secondly, the typology of their historical alignment within ODM—whether they belonged to the patronage-driven, sycophantic funding wing, or the more reflective, strategic, and forward-looking intellectual core.
Thirdly, and perhaps most decisive, their capacity to correctly read the new center of gravity and reposition without overplaying their hand. Those who occupied the funding-sycophancy wing of ODM face the most difficult of moments in this inescapable transition.
Political Capital
Many of them carry inflated political ambitions, built on what was often a borrowed legitimacy—derived from proximity to Raila rather than from independently cultivated political capital.
In the Odingaism era, this worked. Proximity translated into visibility and of cause visibility into perceived influence. But in the emerging (dis)order, that equation no longer holds.
Their assumption that they can seamlessly convert that inherited capital into direct relevance within Ruto’s orbit is, in many cases, proving to be a miscalculation.
Some have even night dreamt of a possibility of high-level incorporation—(seeing themselves as potential Ruto’s deputy presidency picks) calculations and beyond—without sufficiently appreciating the disciplined logic through which Ruto manages political utility.
Kingpins/Queenpins
Compounding this is a second strategic error, namely, the attempt by some in this cohort to position themselves as direct replacements of Raila within their regions claiming to be Hegemons, The Kingpins, and even County Kingpins-and-or Queenpins.
The greatest challenge flowing from this miscalculation is that it has opened up multiple and simultaneous battlefronts, often prematurely. On one hand, they are competing for relevance at the national level—seeking recognition from the new centre of power, even presenting themselves as the new power-brokers in charge of the Luo voter folk.
On the other, they are entrenching themselves in intense local struggles over political succession— claiming to have the power to decide who becomes Member of County Assembly (MCA), Member of Parliament (MP), or county-level power broker. This dual-front contest is not only resource-draining but also structurally unsustainable.
It is driven by a fundamental misreading of the Raila role itself.
Raila was not simply a regional kingpin elevated to national stature. He was a national actor whose regional base was only one component of a much larger political architecture.
Not to mention. The sycophantic-cum-funding wing know nothing beyond politics. Other than the connections they forged through the Raila-enabled unscrupulous dark political market, and the monies squandered from public coffers, most of this cohort members can only claim to be “career politicians”.
Nothing real to offer, this extremely vulnerable to Ruto. Not to mention, they are corrupt to the core and no one really wants/should behave in a manner that might provoke Ruto to unleash the TORCH OF GOVERNMENT that resides at Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) upon them.
Political Reconfiguration
In contrast, those who belonged to the thinking, strategic wing of ODM—however few—appear better positioned for survival. Their strength lies not in inherited mobilization myths, but in their ability to read shifting political currents and adapt accordingly. They are less visible in the current noise, but often more deliberate in their repositioning.
For them, post-Odingaism is not a collapse, but a reconfiguration—one that demands patience, recalibration, and a sober understanding of power.
So in a nutshell, the post-Odingaism moment should not be read as the decline of a political figure or formation. It is about the reconstitution of Kenya’s political order around a new center.
All these is noise that will calm in the post-2027 because Ruto will have to entertain the noise for now. He must because he is determined on the antelope not the hare. And as history consistently shows, such moments are unforgiving to those who mistake proximity for power, noise for influence, and ambition for strategy.
Okombo Odhiambo Kasera is a political scientist and adjunct lecturer at Maseno, Rongo and the University of Kabianga.
